

## The Indo-Lanka crisis (1987-1990)

Solène Soosaithasan, PhD Candidate in the field of Political science, specialised in International Relations, Lille 2 University, CERAPS/ ED74\*

“God save us from our friends, we know how to deal with our enemies”<sup>1</sup>

Indian leaders and Sri Lankan belligerents initiated the Indo-Lanka crisis by the way they interacted through negotiations<sup>2</sup>. However it is not really possible to pick out only one actor behind this type of crisis because every actor has a responsibility in what was later known as a political fiasco<sup>3</sup>. However, the Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi could be designated as the one who really initiated the Indo-Lanka crisis because of its inability to understand the way the Sri Lankan leaders of the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) and of the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam (LTTE) were thinking. Surely he had felt a sense of superiority in comparison to Sri Lankan leaders and finally penalized India's direct involvement in Sri Lanka. Even before the signature of the Indo-Lanka Accord and before India intervened militarily from 1987 to 1990 (GUNARATNA, 1993; MUNI, 1993; PREMDAS, SAMARASINGHE 1993; NARAYAN SWAMY M.R., 2010; MURARI, 2012; WEISS, 2012)<sup>4</sup>, there were already tensions between Indian and Sri Lankan rulers, LTTE's leader Velupillai Prabhakaran included<sup>5</sup>. However, Rajiv Gandhi, then Indian Prime Minister thought that he would be able to ensure India's security by resolving the Sri Lankan conflict finally fell into the trap set by Jayewardene and finally launched a war against the LTTE Tamil insurgents.

It might be necessary to understand the motivations of leaders through discourses or speeches and then how the denial of recognition has indirect effects on interpersonal relations between

---

\* PhD Candidate associated with IRSEM (Institute of Strategic Research-The Military School- French Defence ministry) and associated with IHEDN (Institute for Higher National Defence Studies). Solène Soosaithasan holds a MA Research in Asian History (Contemporary History) from the Pierre Renouvin Institute – Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne in parallel.

<sup>1</sup> Quoted by AGRAWAL Meena, *Rajiv Gandhi*, New Delhi, Diamond Books, 2005.

<sup>2</sup> Sri Lankan President Jayewardene, some of his Cabinet Ministers and the LTTE leader Prabhakaran were not glad that Rajiv Gandhi, and even before him, Indira Gandhi interfered in their business. And Rajiv Gandhi and his closest political and military partners were not able to understand how complicated was the political situation in Sri Lanka and the perceptions those Sri Lankan belligerents had in relation to self-legitimacy, to violence, etc. See MUNI, S.D., *Pangs of Proximity, India and Sri Lanka's Ethnic Crisis*, New Delhi, Sage Publications, 1993

<sup>3</sup> The Indo-Lanka Accord is actually perceived and known as an Indian political fiasco. See an entire section of the literature on it: GUNARATNA, 1993; MUNI, 1993; KADIAN, 1990; PREMDAS, SAMARASINGHE, 1988. However, it is not totally true, see SOOSAITHASAN, 2011.

<sup>4</sup> The anti-Tamil Pogrom of 1983, well known as the Black July 1983 was probably organized by the UNP in power and especially some of its members who were in the Jayewardene Cabinet Minister: Cyril Matthews.

<sup>5</sup> Velupillai Prabhakaran was the leader of the LTTE (Liberation Tamil Tigers Eelam), a Sri Lankan Tamil guerrilla from 1976 to 2009. Cf. NARAYAN SWAMY, (2010), MURARI (2012), WEISS (2012), Tamil Tigers, <http://global.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/581988/Tamil-Tigers>.

countries and more specifically between top leaders (ELIAS, 1997; HABERMAS, 1987; HONNETH, MARGALIT, 2001; LEBOW, 2008; LINDEMANN, 2010). Those interpersonal relations between leaders had direct effects on the deterrence policy and on the rising violence during a crisis. The Indo-Lankan relations, especially from 1987 to 1990 showed how much “recognition is crucial for emotional reasons – not only for increasing an actor’s self-esteem but especially for avoiding shame (dishonour) and humiliation” (LINDEMANN, 2008, p 2). People ordinary seek self-esteem. And this quest for recognition is narrowly linked to the quest for honor (Lebow, 2008, p 123). Moreover, by showing some sense of superiority, Rajiv Gandhi and his allies pushed Prabhakaran to feel his own sense of individual worth, it already existed but it had increased when he was finally cornered. Indeed, it is the denial of recognition from the Indian top leaders that brought the Sri Lankan belligerents, and in particular the LTTE to seek some revenge, bringing India to its knees. Then, violence had emerged and involved more belligerents because it included India. As Thomas Lindemann explained in his book *Causes of War: The Struggle for Recognition*: “it was principally during the 1930s when Germany, Japan and Italy each developed their own hubristic national identities, alleging a racial superiority over other nations” (LINDEMANN, 2010, p 68). This is also seen in one major political figure analyzed throughout this article, Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi (1989-1990) who decided to intervene directly in Sri Lanka. He developed indeed a hubristic personality which had increased to the maximum during the IPKF intervention in Sri Lanka in the 1980s.

At first, it is important to show why India and Sri Lanka share a common legacy. India showed a lot of interest to Sri Lanka because there are two countries which are situated in close proximity to each other and share the same geographical space of the Indian Ocean region. Strategic and security interests of both of these countries are mutually interdependent and interlocking. Countries outside the region have constantly attempted to control the Indian Ocean for many reasons. The Portuguese, the Dutch and then the British came to this island that they called by various names (WEISS, 2012, pp 20-21). But interestingly, when the last European power left Ceylon which got its independence in 1948, Asian powers such as India and China showed some interest to this small country. For instance, China had already shown very early its interest for South Asia. Indeed, China and Sri Lanka signed a Rubber-rice agreement in the 1950’s<sup>6</sup> (DE SILVA, WRIGGINS, 1994; KELEGAMA, 2002). But in order to survive as a viable power and to project an image of strength, India doesn’t really want to see China interfering a lot in Sri Lanka. In fact most of the Indian leaders believe that Sri Lanka belongs to India’s preserve<sup>7</sup>. So

<sup>6</sup> Dr. J.B. Kelegama, The Significance of the Ceylon-China Trade Agreement of 1952, 22 December 2002, <http://www.island.lk/2002/12/22/featur06.html>

<sup>7</sup> Interviews with military officers and politicians in New Delhi, Chennai, Thanjavur, Trichy (India), April 2013.

the political perceptions of Indian rulers, the proximity and the shared regional space are a factor of great importance by determining the nature of interstate relations between these two countries. In fact, the significant aspect is therefore seen through the asymmetry in terms of size, population, resources and military strength that in turn infuses a degree of inequality to the Indo-Lankan relationship. While Sri Lanka the small neighbor invariably may resort to external assistance in order to counter the power asymmetry, therefore creating a 'security threat' just perceived or real to the big neighbor, India may establish for itself a dominant and coercive position towards its small neighbor (LIYANAGE, SAHADEVAN, KINRA, 2011, p 5). As far as India and Sri Lanka are concerned, power asymmetries between the two have played an important role in determining interactions. Given the sheer difference in size, with India occupying an area of 3,287,590 sq. km compared to Sri Lanka's only 65,610 sq km, so there was a threat perception among the Sri Lankan decision-makers and a large part of the population towards the big neighbor State. An understandable assumption of this asymmetry has been that India, as the only big and stable regional power in South Asia, used its authority to influence developments within Sri Lanka and its bilateral relations with its small neighbor in a way that suits its own national, regional and even international political interests. So withdrawal from the European colonial powers had left behind a power vacuum that Sri Lanka perceived India wanted to fill. And it is true that Indira Gandhi and then especially Rajiv Gandhi viewed the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka both as an opportunity and as a threat. The civil conflict, as a matter of ethnic concern would become a danger when it puts in danger India. India then supported the Sri Lankan State's policy of annihilating the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) insurrection: a Sinhala extreme left organization<sup>8</sup>. However, the Sri Lankan civil conflict was also an opportunity for the GoI to intervene in Sri Lanka, getting in some way or another some leverage power on that small neighboring State. That's why, especially after 1977 when Jayewardene was in power, India intervened to help resolving the Sri Lankan conflict because it perceived that Sri Lanka's growing links with the West and with other rivals in South Asia were dangerous for its security. So that gave birth to the Indo-Lanka crisis, very peculiar in comparison to other case studies presented in this special issue. It was a very complicated situation from which the Indian decision makers could not understand the final outcome and which led to increasing violence. So this case study will analyse the escalating crisis and violence caused by the Indian active intervention through negotiations with the Sri Lankan belligerents until the Indo-Lankan Accord allowed an Indian military intervention in Sri Lanka. Following methodical research questions

---

<sup>8</sup> For more details, see the book describing the History of the JVP from 1964 to 1994, they used references to Marx and Lenin to qualify themselves, "adapting Marxism to suit the country", its political reality and uniqueness", p X-XI (Intro), *History of the JVP (People's Liberation Front- Sri Lanka)*, Niyamuwa Publications, 2014 (1<sup>st</sup> Ed.), [http://www.jvpsrilanka.com/en/images/e\\_books/history-of-the-jvp.pdf](http://www.jvpsrilanka.com/en/images/e_books/history-of-the-jvp.pdf)

would help to resolve how the Indo-Lanka crisis turned out finally to be a violent clash between India and especially the LTTE: Who was initiating the Indo-Lanka Crisis? An analytic chronology divided in various phases: before, during and at the end of the crisis. Then, it is important to explore whether Rajiv Gandhi has a hubristic personality or not, then its influence on the Sri Lankan belligerents. Finally, the third part is dedicated to analyse more precisely various characteristics of the Crisis.

### **Who initiated the Indo-Lanka crisis?**

India may have initiated the crisis when dealing with the Indo-Lanka Accord and the Indian military intervention of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF)<sup>9</sup>. Violence was then increasing. But the GoSL can also be considered as the true responsible behind the crisis because Sri Lanka was getting too close with India's rivals. Why did the Government of Sri Lanka challenge India, which was clearly superior in military power and resources? Why did the LTTE members continue their struggle at tremendous human and economic cost even against the IPKF, even if it was initially perceived as a lost cause<sup>10</sup>?

### *Analytic Chronology*

*Escalating violence before the crisis started between India and Sri Lanka.*

The Indo-Lanka crisis cannot be reduced to a very small period or to one exclusive relationship between two main leaders. It had been much diffused. Indian interventions in Sri Lanka were partly determined on how Indian decision-makers like Indira Gandhi and especially Rajiv Gandhi replied to Jayewardene and to his Cabinet members.

There were a few but important regime changes both in India and in Sri Lanka. The ruling Congress Party left on March 1977 because of the election held in India and a new Janata Party led alliance came to power defeating Indira Gandhi. The election results must be interpreted as a sign of opposition to Indira Gandhi's emergency rule and authoritarian tendencies. The new Prime Minister, Moraji Desai was known as a political leader with ideological and operational differences from Nehru and Indira Gandhi about India's domestic, economic and foreign policy matters (DIXIT, 2001, p 118). Moraji Desai was seen as a man of change, it was expected

<sup>9</sup> The IPKF was sent to Sri Lanka to enforce the Indo Lanka Accord signed and ratified by the then Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and the then Sri Lankan President J.R. Jayewardene on the 29<sup>th</sup> July, 1987. The IPKF had the mission to pacify the different Tamil militant groups fighting in the north and east and get them to accept the terms of the accord. See GHOSH, PA, *Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka and Role of Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF)*, New Delhi, APH Publishing Corporation, 1999; SINGH H, *Intervention in Sri Lanka: the IPKF Experience retold*, New Delhi, Manohar Publishers, 2007; RUPESINGHE K., "Ethnic Conflicts in South Asia: the Case of Sri Lanka and the India Peace Keeping Force", *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 25, n° 4, December 1988, pp. 337-350, and so on.

<sup>10</sup> "From Masada to the Irish Easter Rising, from Thermopylae to the resistance of the beleaguered Finns in 1940, history records countless stories of peoples who waged costly struggles with little or no expectation of success. Honor, anger and national-self-respect proved more compelling motives for action than pragmatic calculations of material loss and gain would have been reasons for acquiescence or passivity", p 125, Richard Lebow, *Coercion, Cooperation and Ethics in International Relations*, New York, Routledge, 2007.

that he would abandon Indira Gandhi's socialist, national-state-centralised economic policies and fall in line with 'non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control plans' (DIXIT, 2001, p 119). Simultaneously in Sri Lanka, the elections of May 1977 led to a parallel change when a new government headed by J.R. Jayewardene who was known as a pro-western and a pro-capitalist politician came to power, defeating a centre-left coalition that had been led by the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) headed until then by Sirimavo Bandaranaike. Regime changes in both countries have contributed to maintaining cordial relations between the leaders Moraji Desai and Jayewardene, partly due to the fact that both of them showed strong opposition against their predecessors.

The manner in which inter-regime relationships between the rulers impacted interstate relationships was well demonstrated by the way in which the GoI replied to the anti-Tamil riots that broke out between July and August 1977 (WILSON, 1988, p 75)<sup>11</sup>. Even if there was a great protest in Tamil Nadu and many Indian Tamil political parties were asking for an Indian intervention on the Sri Lankan soil because 100 to 300 Sri Lankan Tamils were killed in Sri Lanka, the Moraji Desai's government didn't want to oppose the GoSL. Nevertheless, the Desai Government sent a representative to Colombo to report back to the Tamil Nadu and Puducherry Chief Ministers that the anti-tamil riots were internal in nature and contained no Indian dimension. There was no real opposition to the GoSL because of the very good personal relationship between Moraji Desai and Jayewardene. Then, Indira Gandhi and her Congress Party came back to power after the elections held in 1980. As A.J. Wilson underlines in his book *The break-up of Sri Lanka: The Sinhalese Tamil Conflict*: «in conversation with Tamil leaders [Indira Gandhi] referred to President Jayewardene and Moraji Desai as the two old foxes» (WILSON, 1988, p 75). By the way, Indira Gandhi was closed to Sirimavo Bandaranaike, previous Sri Lankan Prime Minister, predecessor and rival of Jayewardene and didn't really blame her for its policy towards minorities, especially against the Tamils. There were so many tensions between Indira Gandhi and Jayewardene, "there was no love lost between Indira Gandhi and J.R. Jayewardene" which progressively deteriorated indo-lankan relations (KODIKARA, 1991, p 25). Then the Indian decision-makers like Indira Gandhi became more sensitive to what happened in Sri Lanka, they perceived the civil conflict as a danger and as an opportunity to intervene more directly in the island matters (LIYANAGE, SAHADEVAN, KINRA, 2011, p 30). Indira Gandhi nurtured a very hostile relationship to Jayewardene, "she also looked at the policies of the JRJ Government with mistrust and suspicion" (LIYANAGE, SAHADEVAN, KINRA, 2011, p 36). Jayewardene went closer to many Western countries and to Israel, Pakistan and China to get

---

<sup>11</sup> Literature on relations between political leaders, see for example MCGILVIRAY, Fiona, SMITH, Alastair *Punishing the Prince: A Theory of Interstate Relations, Political Institutions, and Leader Change*, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2008

some financial help in order to annihilate the Tamil guerilla groups, especially the LTTE. And because of a boomerang effect; it created an Indian dynamic against the GoSL. There were further tensions between these two political leaders (personal enmities, different perceptions on economic, social and foreign policies) (GUNARARTNA, 1993; MUNI, 1993; KAPUR, 2009; WEISS, 2012).

In particular, Mrs. Gandhi was retaliating against Jayewardene's policy of rejecting the Indian "security umbrella". And she was also upset about his efforts to gain military and economic support from other powers such as the U.S., China, and Pakistan which were not sympathetic to India's regional aspirations.

India gradually became a dominant, self- aggrandizing regional power by trying to subjugate its weaker neighbors, a tendency which escalated under the "imperial" Mrs. Gandhi in the 1980s. As part of that project, Indira deliberately armed Tamil militant groups; the LTTE was one group among them that was used to destabilize Jayewardene and the Sri Lankan small State (GUNARATNA, 1993).

#### *Crisis propagation*

Indian interventions in Sri Lanka took place many times in various ways since their mutual independence. But the 1980s, with a series of changes on the international and on the national levels led India to adopt a quiet aggressive foreign policy towards Sri Lanka. It is important to link the international progressive structural changes and the Indian interference in the Sri Lankan political matters because there is a narrow link (WENDT, 1992; LIYANAGE, SAHADEVAN, KINRA, 2011). Therefore the way how India intervened in Sri Lanka defending the Sri Lankan Tamil people was negatively perceived by the Sri Lankan decision-makers and by a large part of the Sinhala majority (GUNARATNA, 1993; NARAYAN SWAMY, 2010, WEISS, 2012). While the State Government in Tamil Nadu (India) played a very important role, combined with the pressure from Tamil political parties in competition, some governmental agencies like the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) played an independent role (NARAYAN SWAMY, 2010)<sup>12</sup>.

The events of July 1983 can best be described as a catalyst in worsening Indo- Lanka relations and giving to India a real diplomatic leverage on Sri Lanka in the form of a humanitarian argument to legitimize Indian political and military intervention in the island. The way how India and in particular Indira Gandhi intervened in Sri Lanka to defend the Sri Lankan Tamil people, especially after the Black July, have been described by some contemporary actors at that time as inappropriate for dealing with the Sri Lankan leaders and resolving the Sri Lankan conflict (LIYANAGE, SAHADEVAN, KINRA, 2011, p 49). According to various authors, India gave

---

<sup>12</sup> Interview with Erik Solheim, Paris, April 2014.

shelter to Tamil rebels whenever such refuge was necessary; provided training facilities and military training to Tamil rebels; provided logistical support and even financial support; tried to influence the Sri Lankan Tamil insurgents; gave support to the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), a moderate Tamil political party to negotiate and to find a political solution with the GoSL; India played the role of a third actor actively involved in the conflict putting forward a political solution which fell in line with the Indian political structure; provided humanitarian assistance to Sri Lankan Tamil refugees in India and to the people affected by the war in Jaffna peninsula (DIXON, 1996; REGAN, 2002; FINDLEY, TEO, 2006).

These intervention criteria reached a climax with the signing of the 1987 Indo-Lanka Accord, India was then perceived as a fearful big neighbor State. The Indo-lanka crisis really began from 1985 to 1987 when Rajiv Gandhi, Prime minister and son of the previous PM, was finally perceived as too aggressive by Jayewardene and his Cabinet Ministers in Sri Lanka. And if the Government of India (GoI) had its own agenda, it was the same thing for the local Tamil Nadu State Government and for the Sri Lankan decision-makers and the LTTE, the Tamil rebel group which will become very soon the most prominent guerilla group (MURARI, 2012; WEISS, 2012). Tensions between India and Sri Lanka fuelled under Rajiv Gandhi and Jayewardene when the GoSL started once again to re-arm and strengthen its security forces in 1985, turning once again to countries like Pakistan, Israel and other countries to pursue its war agenda against the Tamil Rebel groups (HAGERTY, 1991). There were many negotiation rounds India “persuaded” the GoSL and various Tamil parties involved in the conflict to try to find a common political solution: for instance there were the Thimphu Talks in Bhutan, the APC and the Annexure C, Proposals of the 19<sup>th</sup> December and finally the Indo Lanka Accord. However, except maybe for the TULF under Amirthalingam which was searching a political solution, the GoSL and some Tamil Rebel groups, especially the LTTE were not really interested in the outcome of the negotiations but they played the game for a while because of what they perceived as pressures from India. While Sri Lankan decision-makers had in mind the framework of proposals they gave during several negotiations rounds, the Tamil Rebels were thinking of a separate Tamil State (*Tamil Eelam*) and were focused on the Indian military intervention in “East Pakistan” which gave birth to Bangladesh (LOGANATHAN, 2006). None of these actors were able to move out of their rigid positions. Thomas Abraham recalls that “it was not possible to persuade [the Tamil Rebel groups] or the Sri Lankan government to reach an agreement...” (ABRAHAM, 2006, p 17). Because of this, Rajiv Gandhi felt it was India’s responsibility to put more and more pressure on the Sri Lankan actors involved in the civil conflict. But most of the belligerents found Indian interferences pernicious.

*Bellicose Outcome for the crisis: humiliations and frustrations for India*

The quiet cordial relationship between Rajiv Gandhi and Jayewardene quickly went wrong<sup>13</sup>. Early in 1987, Prabhakaran left Tamil Nadu and returned to Jaffna peninsula in Sri Lanka. The LTTE was about to take over the civil administration in the North by conquering Jaffna. In response to these new developments, the GoSL retaliated by imposing an economic embargo and thereby making the life of the Jaffna people extremely difficult. Rajiv Gandhi called for a cease-fire but neither the LTTE nor the GoSL were ready to follow his counsels. A brief cease-fire was stopped after the LTTE was blamed for a bomb explosion in Colombo (Sri Lanka). In the last week of May 1987, the Sri Lankan security forces launched a massive military operation on the Jaffna peninsula. There were different opinions in Sri Lanka on the issue of escalating violence due to military operations and because of the choice of a military solution rather than a political one (LIYANAGE, SAHADEVAN, KINRA, 2011, p 62). The presence of different opinions within the Sri Lankan Cabinet ministers appeared to have also been linked to the struggle of political succession occurring in the South. Two of the contenders, the Prime Minister Premadasa and the National Security Minister Lalith Athulathmudali wanted a strong military action and publicly expressed their anti-Indian stand while the Mahaweli Minister Gamini Dissanayake took a conciliatory position and recognized that the GoSL had to consider India's primary position in South Asia. Jayewardene's well-known position towards the Tamil problem decided to choose the military option to resolve it<sup>14</sup>. "Operation Liberation" was led by the Sri Lankan security forces on 26<sup>th</sup> May, 1987; it was a major offensive against the LTTE and, as a result, Vadamarachchi area came under the GoSL's control. Tamil Nadu pressurized New Delhi to intervene in Sri Lanka and to save the Sri Lankan Tamils from the Sri Lankan security forces. The backing of the Sri Lankan Tamils and of the LTTE seen as a freedom movement at that time was very high. And to the Indian rulers, had a victory of the Sri Lankan security forces occurred against the Tamil rebels, it would be a defeat for the Indian foreign policy agenda that had been at work in Sri Lanka since the early 1980s. Indian decision-makers would have believed that such a military victory would compromise the role of India in South Asia and towards the Tamils in Tamil Nadu and in Sri Lanka. So Rajiv Gandhi adopted a more firm attitude than even before and continued on the path opened by his mother and previous Indian Prime Minister. The GoI told the GoSL to stop its military major offensive against the LTTE because the Tamil civilians

<sup>13</sup> Ranasinghe Premadasa was the Sri Lankan Prime Minister from 1978 to 1989 under Jayewardene's presidency and became in turn the Sri Lankan President from 1989 to 1993.

<sup>14</sup> Gordon Weiss and many other scholars noted that the Black July happened under Jayewardene's presidency. And various ministers like Cyril Mathew were deeply involved in this anti-tamil pogrom. Such amount of violence perpetrated against a part of the population was only possible if Jayewardene and the GoSL were aware...Indeed, Jayewardene's position to Jaffna Tamils was clear, "I am not worried about the opinion of the Jaffna (Tamil) people now. Now we cannot think of them. Not about their lives or of their opinion about us. The more you put pressure on the north, the happier the Sinhala people will be here... really, if I starve the Tamils, Sinhala people will be happy", quoted by CHATTERJI, M., JAIN B.M. Conflict and Peace in South Asia, from the *Daily Telegraph* (1983) p 136.



were suffering in Jaffna from the embargo and from the war assaults, trying to persuade it to move once again toward a political settlement. Jayewardene and his Cabinet ministers decided that they will not listen to India. Therefore, Rajiv Gandhi's attempts to use a soft diplomatic pressure on the GoSL failed. At that moment, it was clear that the GoSL with Jayewardene and some of his Ministers engaged themselves in a show of force with India. Shortly after, on the 2<sup>nd</sup> June 1987, India tried to send humanitarian assistance to the Jaffna Peninsula through a civilian convoy of ships but these vessels were intercepted and turned back by the Sri Lankan Navy<sup>15</sup>. After the GoSL send its navy to intercept and stop these Indian ships, the Indian decision-makers reacted to this with anger: Rajiv Gandhi was in fact furious (SINGH, 2011, MURARI, 2012). The Indian government reacted more violently than the Sri Lankan rulers could have thought. It gave birth to a situation where every actors involved were not ready to listen or to recognize the other ones. So a clash happened and those war protagonists fuelled the crisis.

At that point, India wanted to fight back Sri Lanka's impudence with a show of force to compel its small neighbor to recognize it as it should be. And simultaneously, Indian decision-makers wanted to show their support to the Tamil Rebels and to the Tamil issue. These two factors would in turn contribute to preserve the credibility of Rajiv Gandhi because he needed to show the voters in Tamil Nadu that he would safeguard the rights and interests of Sri Lankan Tamils while he also had to show to Sri Lanka that India was still a powerful country. He considered that it was his responsibility to safeguard India's dominant position in the Indian Ocean region but he had to handle the Sri Lankan problem at first. The Indian Army led the "Operation Poomalai" (Operation Garland in English) or Eagle Mission 4<sup>16</sup>. Operation Poomalai involved the dropping of relief supplies on Jaffna. It was carried out by the Indian Air Force using 5 AN-32 planes escorted by 4 Mirage 2000H fighter jets as a counter measure against any potential opposition by the Sri Lankan Air Force<sup>17</sup>. The air fighter support and the violation of the Sri Lankan airspace were symbolic in nature. India wanted to assert its place in the power gaming of the region. It impacted the perceptions of a large part of the Sinhalese and thereby some Sinhala politicians spoke about passed South Indian invasions and modern ones like this one<sup>18</sup>. And no country stood strongly for Sri Lanka, showing India's dominant and undisputed position role in South Asia. So the President Jayewardene, the Mahaweli Minister Gamini Dissanayake and a few others finally recognized that they should take seriously into consideration India's interests and Tamil

<sup>15</sup> « Indians to send convoy to Sri Lanka », *New York Times*, June 2<sup>nd</sup> 1987; "Indian Flotilla turned back by Sri Lankan Navy vessels, *New York Times*, 4<sup>th</sup> June 1987.

<sup>16</sup> Bharat-Rashak (2008), « Operation Poomalai-India Intervention », <http://www.bharat-rashak.com/LAND-FORCES/Army/History/1987/Chapter02.html>

<sup>17</sup> « India Air Lifts Aid to Tamil Rebels », *New York Times*, 5th June 1987, Bharat-Rashak, « Indian Air Force in Sri Lankan Operation Poomalai-The Jaffna Food Drop », <http://www.bharat-rashak.com/IAF/History/1987IPKF/Chapter1.html>

<sup>18</sup> Ranjith SOYSA, "The Indian Intervention on 29<sup>th</sup> July 1987- "the 17<sup>th</sup> Invasion of Sri Lanka by India in the Island's 2500 Year History", July 30<sup>th</sup>, 2013, <http://www.asiantribune.com/node/63316>

demands. Whereas the Prime Minister Premadasa, the National Security Minister Lalith Athulathmudali and others still rejected India's role, they didn't want to give up Sri Lanka's sovereignty to a neighboring country. However, this second group did not provide any viable alternative plan this time and therefore the position of the first one mattered (LIYANAGE, SAHADEVAN, KINRA, 2011, p 64).

After what happened, Jayewardene found negotiating with India the only policy option left and viable for Sri Lanka (WEISS, 2012). So as quickly as possible, on the 29<sup>th</sup> of July 1987, Rajiv Gandhi and Jayewardene signed the Indo Lanka Accord. By the way, India strengthened its hegemonic position in the region. While India seemed to have strengthened its position, it was more complicated in the long-term because Rajiv's strategy was finally a mistake. Within 24 hours of signing the Accord, a small contingent of Indian forces (IPKF) landed in Jaffna and they were welcomed by the Tamil civilians as their saviours. Several political parties, the SLFP and the JVP opposed the Accord. Many UNP Cabinet Ministers refused to attend the signing ceremony at the President's House<sup>19</sup>. On the Tamil side, TELO and other Rebel groups accepted Indian advices or pressure, and although the LTTE was informed about the main lines of the Accord, Prabhakaran was not pleased at all with the content and with Rajiv Gandhi pressurizing him but the LTTE leaders were almost forced to fall in line with what the Indian decision-makers decided (SWAMY S., 2007, NARAYAN SWAMY M.R., 2010, MURARI, 2012). Prabhakaran's Sudumalai Speech on the 4<sup>th</sup> of August 1987 demonstrated the real mood and position of the LTTE over the Accord (WEISS, 2012)<sup>20</sup>.

By October 1987, shortly after the signing of the Indo Lanka Accord, the IPKF was at war with the LTTE especially in the Northern but also in the Eastern Provinces. From a small contingent, the IPKF gradually increased to nearly 100,000 persons to counter the intense and well-planned attacks of the LTTE (LIYANAGE, SAHADEVAN, KINRA, 2011, p 73).

Then, after many attacks and several casualties in the North between the IPKF and the LTTE and in the South between the Sri Lankan security forces and the JVP, Premadasa was elected President during the elections of 1988. He opened the way for political negotiations with the LTTE and the JVP. He accepted them to the negotiation table in order to tell him their grievances. While the LTTE took this opportunity to get a cease-fire and to be relieved for a while from the IPKF, the JVP continued to spread violence in the South. As a national leader,

<sup>19</sup> The Prime Minister and then Sri Lankan President Premadasa was the greatest opponent to Indian involvement in Sri Lankan matters and to the Indo Lanka Accord. Lalith Athulathmudali, Gamini Jayasuriya were also against the Indo-Lanka Accord and the Indian presence in Sri Lanka.

PERERA, Janaka, "Indo-Lanka Accord: Sri Lanka's 'Finlandisation'", *Asian Tribune*, 20th July 2013, <http://www.asiantribune.com/node/63310>;

<sup>20</sup> Prabhakaran's Sudumalai Speech, 4 august 1987, the Speech can be heard here at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XMLu3wpCnA>. See also SUBRAMANIAM T.S., "We will fight for our political objective" (Interview with Prabhakaran), vol. 27, Issue 1, January 2010, *FRONTLINE*, <http://www.frontline.in/static/html/fl2701/stories/19870822078.htm>

Premadasa fuelled once again tensions between the two countries by asking India to withdraw its army (BROADHEAD, KEOWN, 2006, p 135; WEISS, 2012). Tensions between Rajiv Gandhi and Premadasa were at their climax. The general elections in India saw a victory for the Janata Dal coalition supported by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the communists and other heteroclitics political parties came to power, all were opposed to the Congress Party. The new GoI assumed office on 2<sup>nd</sup> of December 1989 putting an end to Rajiv Gandhi's (too much?) ambitious policy in Sri Lanka. Then the new government answered positively to Sri Lanka's request and agreed that the IPKF would be fully withdrawn from Sri Lankan soil by the 31<sup>st</sup> March 1990. In fact, on 24<sup>th</sup> of March 1990, the IPKF left Sri Lankan soil with a great feeling of humiliation and frustration because of the brutal blow given by the LTTE. More than 1,000 Indian soldiers from the IPKF were killed and about twice that number got wounded.

So the inter-relationships between decision-makers have an important and real impact on the indo-lanka crisis.

### *Second step*

Since its independence, India used to perceive itself as a democratic political regime, whatever the government changes are. When Indira Gandhi proposed India's "good offices" to find a political settlement to Sri Lanka's civil tensions, Jayewardene accepted (ABRAHAM, 2006, p 11). Even if it was only facilitation and not ordinary mediation, he might have not the choice at that moment because he had not enough leverage against India (BERCOVITCH, 1991; DIXON, 1996; FRAZIER, DIXON, 2006)<sup>21</sup>. He conveyed an All Party Conference (APC) to meet Tamil grievances and to discuss about possible solutions to their problems. At that time, Indira Gandhi backed the moderate Sri Lankan Tamil political party, the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF)<sup>22</sup>. A special envoy was sent by the GoI to meet Jayewardene, its Cabinet Ministers, the TULF leaders and various Tamil rebel groups. The results of these consultations were presented to the APC as the Annexure C document on December 1984 (LIYANAGE, SAHADEVAN, KINRA, 2011, p 53). However, India's first attempt as a facilitator failed because Jayewardene and other actors involved in the political process did their best to reject the Annexure C. So even if Indira Gandhi adopted authoritarian policies, India's legacy and way of being were showing that it was THE South Asian democracy (KAPUR, 2009). And the most important element to

<sup>21</sup> "A process of conflict management where disputants seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an individual, group, state, or organization to settle their conflict or resolve their differences without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of the law.", BERCOVITCH, ANAGNOSON, WILLE< BERCOVITCH, Jacob, "International Mediation", *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 28, n°1, February 1991, pp. 3-6; DIXON, William J., "Third-party techniques for preventing conflict escalation and promoting peaceful settlement", *International Organization*, vol. 50, n°4, 1996, pp. 653-81;

<sup>22</sup> The TULF was created in 1976. They were behind the Vaddukoddai Resolution adopted in 1976 and defined their aim, a Tamil Eelam, See SATP, [http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/shrilanka/document/papers/vaddukoddai\\_resolution.htm](http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/shrilanka/document/papers/vaddukoddai_resolution.htm)

notice is when Rajiv Gandhi came to power; India was once again proclaimed a democratic power that other countries in South Asia should imitate.

*The hubristic presentation of the leader*

As seen previously, during the Indo Lanka Crisis, there was not only one high political leader behind it. Indeed there were three Indian Prime Ministers during the Indo-Sri Lanka Crisis: Indira Gandhi, Rajiv Gandhi and finally Vishwanath Pratap Singh<sup>23</sup>. However, for this case study based on the Indo-Lanka Accord and the IPKF military intervention in Sri Lanka, the most relevant leader is Rajiv Gandhi. Because Rajiv Gandhi was inexperienced in national politics, and furthermore in international relations politics, the way he acted was compared to pride by Sri Lankan politicians and LTTE members (AGRAWAL, 2005, p 34). However, that was not really the case even if it is true that Rajiv Gandhi gained self-confidence.

It is very complicated to measure the hubristic personality of Rajiv Gandhi. The hubristic personality can be measurable via letters and correspondence, speeches, TV or radio shows, political decisions taken (OWEN, 2006; ROSENTHAL, PITTINSKY, 2006; OWEN, DAVIDSON, BRAIN, 2009; JUDGE, PICCOLO, KOSALKA, 2009; LEBOW, 2008, LINDEMANN, 2010; RUSSELL, 2011; THEAKSTON, 2011). Indeed *hubris* is an ancient Greek word meaning an exaggerated amount of pride or of self-confidence, linked to a strong self-esteem. Aeschylus showed how the Persians were full of hubris and explained by this why they finally lost against the Greek. Homer described at various moments how Achilles or Agamemnon were full of hubris when they had to take decisions (LEBOW, 2008).

Rajiv Gandhi, the most prominent leader during the indo-lanka crisis may have taken the decision to build monuments. However, it was not really the case because a large part of Indian buildings allocated to Indian leaders or to the Indian Institutions were British legacy. However as a political leader, Rajiv Gandhi tried to give a specific image of himself in India but also to the Sri Lankan leaders, in South Asia and in the international arena but without a full knowledge of what he was doing. When he came to power, "he had limited experience in politics with no real interest in it" (KAPUR, 2009, p 215). Because of a crash accident of his elder brother engaged in politics; and later on with the assassination of his mother, Rajiv Gandhi entered into politics because he was forced to carry a name and a dynasty: the Nehru-Gandhi. Given his education in an anglicized school at Dehra Dun (India) and after that he went to Cambridge (Trinity College-UK) and to Imperial College (UK), he was probably attracted by the Western World. He adopted some western perceptions (political and economic liberalism). Nevertheless, even if it was the

---

<sup>23</sup> Harish Kapur consecrated an entire book on the Foreign Policies of India's Prime Ministers. He interestingly noted in his preface that he had focused on "the personality factor and leadership in the determination of the foreign policy" and "individual personality connected with the decision". It sounds relevant to the Indo-Lanka crisis and how leaders like Rajiv Gandhi dealt with.

case, the way he finally evolved was another matter; "India was ideologically non-aligned, officially committed to socialism, and politically aligned to the Soviet Union" (KAPUR, 2009, p 216). So he was more or less forced to follow the path of his predecessors, especially his mother and former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi because there was no revolutionary change in the domestic, regional or in the international arena. In a sense, we can say that path dependence can be applied to him too (KRASNER, 1984; PIERSON, 1996; MULLER, SUREL, 1998; HOWLETT, RAYNER, 2006; PALIER, 2010). His decisions were highly influenced by a political environment already predefined.

*Hubristic personality and its negative influence on other leaders*

When he began his foreign policy, his impact was important on other political actors too, especially on Sri Lankan belligerents. The way Harish Kapur qualifies him as "impulsive" and "impatient" signifies a lot because of what happened in Sri Lanka (KAPUR, 2009, p 215). He seemed to have adopted strong views in regard to what he wanted to project of himself internationally. So he quickly became an ambitious leader acquiring some international status and visibility. He left his imprint as a Prime Minister on the foreign affairs and even on the Sri Lankan civil conflict. Rajiv Gandhi gained confidence in foreign affairs matters but the Sri Lankan politicians and the LTTE perceived it as too dangerous. He was very smart, self-confident in the negotiations with other leaders but was also finally perceived as over-reacting (KAPUR, 2009). However, the way he involved in the Sri Lankan conflict would have been a way to distract people from domestic or internal problems: Bofors scandal, etc <sup>24</sup>. It appeared to a lot of people that Rajiv Gandhi was seeking to protect corrupt associates, and perhaps even himself. This had grave political implications for him (...) <sup>25</sup>. Rajiv Gandhi was indeed criticized for taking India back to old practices of manipulation for personal and practical reasons, following his mother's example. It created once again an authoritarian atmosphere in India and its neighborhood. However, according to Meena Agrawal who is not really neutral and seems closed to Gandhi's family, Rajiv Gandhi was accused by the opposite party but was innocent in the Bofors Scandal (AGRAWAL, 2005).

- **The enemy's image?** First of all, how is defined an enemy? It depends on actors, on their environment and on their perception. The Indian decision makers like Rajiv Gandhi did not consider the GoSL neither the LTTE as their enemies. And in turn, Sri Lankan belligerents did not consider India as a true enemy. However, there were a lot of tensions between them because

<sup>24</sup> "Rajiv Gandhi wanted Bofors Money to rule the Congress: Ex- CBI Chief", The Times of India, 14 November 2013, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Rajiv-Gandhi-wanted-Bofors-money-to-run-Congress-Ex-CBI-chief/articleshow/25720914.cms>,

<sup>25</sup> 'Developments in South Asia', *Strategic Survey*, 88 (1), P 144, pp 142-149, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/04597238708460752>

they mistrust one another, "allies tend to fight each other" (MAOZ, TERRIS, 2007, p 101). And one can consider that Sri Lanka perceived India as an enemy when "a State considers another State as an actual or potential enemy to the extent that it perceives the latter's intentions or actions as threatening the focal State's interests" (MAOZ, TERRIS, 2007, p 101). However, even if the indo-lankan relations were under tension, no true enmity was openly declared. Even if there are slight varying degrees, mistrust and enmity are not interchangeable in their use. Indeed, it is not only Sri Lanka which remains difficult to India to handle with but South Asia too. Like his predecessors, Rajiv Gandhi was not able to make any substantive headway in developing relations with any of those South Asian leaders except Bhutan. The Sri Lankan President Jayewardene did not seek India's help to resolve the Sri Lankan conflict. Even if he tried to get closer to Rajiv Gandhi at the beginning, he became quickly mistrustful and fearful of India and of its ambitions. Rajiv Gandhi did not succeed to be trusted by the Sri Lankan leaders, nor did he have the capacity of forcing them to fall in line with India's objectives and ambitions. Rajiv Gandhi and his foreign ministers or advisers finally found difficult to resolve the Sri Lankan conflict because there were numerous actors: the GoSL, the TULF and various guerrillas groups. The two most prominent adversaries of the Indian government for the good implementation of the Indo-Lanka Accord were the GoSL and the Tamil rebel group LTTE. In fact, Jayewardene accepted to sign and implement the Accord but he was subtle to do the things his own ways. He was not so happy that such an Accord opened the way for India's interference in Sri Lankan internal affairs but he was also very smart to divert the focus on something else... Prabhakaran apparently accepted to fall in line with India but that was not really the case, he quickly took an open opposite path. And with Prabhakaran who engaged the LTTE in a war against the IPKF presence in the Northern and Eastern areas, India had no more choice than becoming a part to the conflict. While the GoSL wanted to maintain Sri Lanka's territorial integrity, the LTTE did not want to give up his ultra aim of a separate territory where Sri Lankan Tamils were living in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. So India was stuck in the middle and finally got trapped in the conflict. The way how Rajiv Gandhi interacted with Prabhakaran led to a very conflictual path, one can say them same thing for Prabhakaran, he would have "forgive(n) damage to its interests, but not injury to its honour, and certainly not when this is done in a spirit of priggish self-righteousness" (WEBER, LASSMAN, SPIERS, 1994).

#### **- The political regime:**

3: authoritarian regime; 2: combined regime but rather an authoritarian one; 1: more or less democratic ; 0 : democratic.

< The Indian political regime is rather a democratic one (1).

• **Hubristic presentation of the leader**

3 : strong appearance; 2 : moderate ; 1 : weak ; 0 : no hubristic show of force.

< The leader has a moderate one (2)

• **The image of the enemy**

3: very strong and visible images of the enemy; 2: important images; 1 : presence of images but without any dogma ; 0 : no image of the enemy.

< Presence of images but without any dogma (1)

*Third Step*

Dramatic changes occurred in South Asia, in the 1980's and not only in the international arena; Indo-Lankan relations reveal much about it.

Before the Crisis

**Deterrent policy:** The configuration of international forces was changing in the 1980's. Indian decision-makers, especially Rajiv Gandhi had to take this into account while negotiating with the Sri Lankan rulers for example. The USSR was in the midst of a major transition. The Brezhnev period had passed and Mikhail Gorbachev, leading the USSR from March 1985 and belonging to a new generation of leaders, appeared to be determined to democratize the Soviet system, and seek an understanding with the United States. But at the same time, the Soviet Union also began to show signs of international decline. Gorbachev withdrew the USSR from Afghanistan, diminished the Soviet military presence and witnessed the decline of communism in Eastern Europe, its disappearance from Eastern Germany with the reunification of GDR and FRG. However, even if USSR's influence decreased, Rajiv Gandhi did not take any steps to distance himself from the Soviet Union. In fact, he continued to follow the path opened by his predecessors. There was no explicit attempt to move away from Moscow; Rajiv Gandhi forged a personal relationship with Gorbachev (KAPUR, 2009, pp. 221-222). And given this positive relationship with the USSR, India and the United States have been closer and closer under Rajiv Gandhi than under any other predecessors. However, with the education he received and the political formation he went through, the United States were the country he was genuinely attracted to. Therefore, he was willing to get closer to the United States because there were signs of slight and complex mutations in the attitude of the American leaders towards India in the mid-

eighties. Ronald Reagan was considering that India can be of a great help because of China's expansion and potential threat, USSR was at that time on the decline and Pakistan was moving away with some fundamentalist movements within the government and within the army: "The Reagan administration was presumably well-briefed on Rajiv Gandhi: that he was ideologically closer to Washington, that he was personally pro-western in his political make-up (...)" (KAPUR, 2009, pp. 223).

However, Rajiv Gandhi was not inclined to nurture the same love towards China. When he became the Prime Minister, he was not really willing to pursue his mother's will to get normal relations with China. But progressively and relatively quickly, he changed his mind and opened the way for a closer relationship between India and China (KAPUR, 2009, pp. 224-228).

And when considering the relations between India and Sri Lanka before the crisis, the first phase lasted from July 1983 to October 1984 when Indira Gandhi ruled, following the Ethnic Riots, India began to assume a mediatory role through G. Parthasarathy who was negotiating the principles of settlement, known as 'Annexure C', between the GoSL and the Tamil groups. A second track that Indira Gandhi concurrently pursued was to promote and encourage on Indian soil various Sri Lankan Tamil militant groups under the direction of the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW). As Muni admitted, RAW was asked to penetrate these groups "providing them with training, money and arms to limit their militancy, erode their external linkages and bring them under Indian influence" (MUNI, 1993).

Like his mother and predecessor, Rajiv Gandhi followed Indira Gandhi's example. Indira Gandhi adopted two tracks policy, the first one was a diplomatic one and the another one was more officious and a more subtle one which was against Jayewardene and the GoSL's interests. So did Rajiv Gandhi. And his aim was not to promote the LTTE the sole representatives of the Sri Lankan Tamils but to use them and many other Tamil rebel groups to win negotiations with the GoSL. After various political negotiations with the Indian Prime Minister, then Jayewardene choose the military option with the Vadamarachchi Operation even if he knew that it will not please India. At that point, Jayewardene's decision was perceived as provoking India's supremacy. So Rajiv Gandhi decided to intervene more directly. By boat and air, relief supplies were sent to Jaffna in June 1987 to be followed by the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord in July. So at that time, the Sri Lankan President Junius R. Jayewardene tried to use some means to counterbalance India's powerful position. In fact, the Sri Lankan army couldn't militarily oppose the Indian army; it seems evident because there is a show of force between a very small State and a bigger one. For example, in 1986 the Indian army had 1,260,000 in the regular forces and more than 200,000 men



in the reserves whereas Sri Lanka had only 37, 660 including active reservists<sup>26</sup>. So if Sri Lanka could not counterbalance India on its own, Jayewardene and his Cabinet ministers tried to get closer to western countries in the early 1980s.

**-Reinsurance policy:** According to *The Military Balance* from the IISS in 1987, the Indian army had real offensive military capacities while Sri Lanka has been a small State with smaller capacities<sup>27</sup>. There was no detailed data on Indian defensive military capacities because the survey of 1987 was not clearly giving access to it. Instead of that, those data may show that in 1987, from a structural point of view, that India had no real distinct offensive-defensive military capacities. Towards a small neighboring State as Sri Lanka, there was no real need to frighten it with heavy weapons. However, India needed to establish for itself a dominant and coercive position while maintaining apparent cordial relations with Sri Lanka. For instance, in May 1987, while Sri Lankan security forces launched a massive military operation called 'Operation Liberation', the Indian government was not inclined to accept such an insult. To India, a victory for the Sri Lankan army against the rebels was a defeat for Rajiv Gandhi's foreign policy agenda that had been at work in Sri Lanka. When the GoI asked the Sri Lankan President Jayewardene to stop its military assault and move toward a negotiated settlement, the GoSL did not want to surrender to India's pressure. So, on 2nd June 1987, the GoI decided to send humanitarian assistance through civilian ships to Jaffna peninsula. But those ships were intercepted and turned back by the Sri Lankan Navy. After all these events, full of anger, Rajiv Gandhi decided to use a show of force to give Sri Lanka a good lesson about India's Importance in South Asia and in the international arena.

#### - Economic Policy

Since its independence, India's economy grew at an important rate and until the 1980s, 3 to 4 percent per annum. In the 1980s, "the Indian economy has grown within the framework of a democracy" (KOHLI, 2006). Under Rajiv Gandhi, India was not really going through an economic crisis, even if Atul Kohli thought quite the opposite "while budget deficits and the size of the public debt grew during Indira Gandhi years, it was downright modest in comparison to what followed in the Rajiv period" (KOHLI, 2006). Debt was combined to a period of high growth rate. There were no international economic sanctions from the International community because Indian intervention in the Sri Lankan conflict was perceived in the Western countries as a good gesture but also as normal from a regional power.

<sup>26</sup> *Asia and Pacific (IISI)*, India, see p 154 and Sri Lanka, see p 168, <http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/tmib20/87/1#.VajbAKTtIbC>

<sup>27</sup> *The Military Balance (IISI)*, pp. 156, 157 (Indian Military capacities) and pp. 171, 172 (Sri Lankan Military capacities). <http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/tmib20/87/1#.VajbAKTtIbC>

**-Policy of recognition (what kind of recognition in the international arena?):** By proposing the Indo-Lanka Accord and showing an interest on resolving the Sri Lankan conflict, Rajiv Gandhi was perceived as the key intermediary between the GoSL and the LTTE. Rajiv was even proposed for the Peace Nobel Prize<sup>28</sup>. And, even if the USSR was an ally, the United States and a large part of the International Community supported India's initiative for resolving the conflict. India was still perceived as a stable and pacific power, and one of the main leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement. In 1956, Nehru opened the way for India to be heard in the international arena and to become a recognized power in Asia and on the international arena. But recognition has not been a simple matter when it deals with various and powerful Asian States like China and Pakistan for example.

• **Policy of deterrence (2).**

< 3: strong; 2: moderate; 1 : weak ; 0 : null.

• **Reassurance policy (2)**

< 3: very good; 2: good; 1 : weak ; 0 : very weak.

• **Economic policy (1)**

< 3: good; 2: quiet good; 1: difficult ; 0 : very difficult

• **Symbolic policy (1)**

From an Indian point of view during the Crisis, the Indian decision-makers believed that they were recognized. There was a minor denial of recognition (perceived especially by Rajiv Gandhi) and Indian leader did not take any decision to be better recognized and/or accepted.

3: Major Recognition problems; 2: Significant problems; 1: minor problems; 0: no problem

*Fourth Step*

During the Crisis

New Delhi's initiative, which led to the Accord of 29th July and the arrival of thousands of Indian troops on the island, was in large measure unproductive. It was undertaken against the wishes of Sri Lanka's leaders, and it has not succeeded in completely ending the fighting on the island. In effect, it has turned India from a protector of the Tamils to a force attempting to control them. The transfer of Indian troops to Sri Lanka has also reawakened old fears about

<sup>28</sup> "Nehru and Indian Foreign Policy. 27<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of Indo-Lanka Accord", *The Island*, 26 July 2014, [http://www.island.lk/index.php?page\\_cat=article-details&page=article-details&code\\_title=107437](http://www.island.lk/index.php?page_cat=article-details&page=article-details&code_title=107437)

their own security in the minds of India's smaller neighbors<sup>29</sup>. “At this point India intervened to compel President Jayewardene to halt the advance. It did so partly because it feared massacres of civilians and LTTE’s annihilation if the Sri Lankan army entered Jaffna, partly because Gandhi needed a diplomatic triumph, and partly because he was under pressure from the Tamils in the south of India to prevent a bloodbath of Tamils in Sri Lanka”<sup>30</sup>.

- **Deterrence policy:** Rajiv Gandhi forced the Sri Lankan President Jayewardene to accept the Indo-Lanka Accord and the Indian intervention by threatening to send the Indian army into Tamil northern and eastern areas with or without his consent. And when the Indian army arrived in Sri Lanka in 1987, it reached unto 53,000 men while the Sri Lankan army was only compound of 40,000 men<sup>31</sup>.

According to that, Jayewardene was officially showing he accepted the Indo-lanka Accord and the Indian Intervention. But in private, archives show that he finally nurtured bad relations with Rajiv Gandhi. This type of relationship between leaders badly affected the outcome of the Indo-Lanka Accord and influenced how India would later handle the Sri Lankan conflict.

In perspective, recognition policy or recognition denial- The Indo-Lanka Accord had been imposed on both Sinhalese and Tamil extremists components against their wills, even if some actors like government members or the LTTE showed officially their consent. However, officiously, it was another story and the different parties involved in the conflict showed their true ambitions when they were eager to blow violence on their adversaries.

### • Policy of deterrence (3).

< 3 : strong ; 2 : moderate ; 1 : weak ; 0 : null

### • Reassurance Policy (1)

< 3 : very good ; 2 : good ; 1 : weak ; 0 : very weak

### • Economic policy (2)

< 3: good; 2 : quiet good ; 1 : difficult ; 0 : very difficult

### • Symbolic policy (3)

From an Indian point of view during the Crisis, the Indian decision-makers believed that they

<sup>29</sup> ‘Developments in South Asia’, *Strategic Survey*, 88 (1), 1987, pp 142-149, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/04597238708460752>, p 143.

<sup>30</sup> (1987), ‘Developments in South Asia’, *Strategic Survey*, 88 (1), 1987, pp 142-149, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/04597238708460752>, p 146.

<sup>31</sup> ‘Asia and Australasia’, *The Military Balance*, 88(1), 1988, pp 146-172, p 177, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/04597228808460000>

were recognized. But it quickly went wrong. Prabhakaran and Premadasa denied recognition to Rajiv Gandhi and refused India's direct and active interventions in the Sri Lankan Conflict. High recognition Issues and finally perceived by Rajiv Gandhi. Prabhakaran decided that the LTTE must fight the IPFK and be engaged in an open war against India.

3: Major Recognition problems; 2: Significant problems; 1: minor problems; 0: no problem

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

### Theoretical Books

- LINDEMANN, Thomas, *Causes of war, The struggle for Recognition*, Colchester, ECPR Press, 2010
- LEBOW, Richard N., *Coercion, Cooperation and Ethics in International Relations*, New York, Routledge, 2007.
- RISSE, Thomas, ROPP, S.C., SINKKINK, Kathryn (Eds.), *The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999.
- WENDT, Alexander, *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999.

### Specific Books

- AGRAWAL Meena, *Rajiv Gandhi*, New Delhi, Diamond Books, 2005.
- BROADHEAD, Philipp, KEOWN, Damien, *Can Faith make Peace? Holy Wars and the Resolution of Religious Conflicts*, London/ New York, I.B. Tauris, 2006.
- DE SILVA, K.M., *Regional Powers and Small State Security: India and Sri Lanka, 1977-1990*, Washington D.C., Woodrow Wilson Press Center, 1995
- DE SILVA, K.M., WRIGGINS, Howard, J.R. *Jayewardene of Sri Lanka. A Political Biography, the First Fifty Years*, Honolulu-United States, University of Hawaii Press, 1988
- DIXIT, J.N., *India's Foreign Policy and its Neighbours*, NEW Delhi, Gyan Publishing House, 2001
- GHOSH, P.A., *Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka and Role of Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF)*, New Delhi, APH Publishing Corporation, 1999
- GUNARATNA Rohan, *Indian intervention in Sri Lanka: The Role of India's intelligence agencies*, Colombo, South Asian Network on Conflict Research, 1993.
- KAPUR, Harish, *Foreign Policies of India's Prime Ministers*, Lancer International, 2009
- KRISHNA Sankaran, *Postcolonial insecurity: India, Sri Lanka, and the question of nationhood*, Minnesota, Borderlines, 1999
- LIYANAGE, Sumanisiri, SAHADEVAN, P., KINRA, Anisha (Eds.), *Intra-State conflict and Inter-State Relations. Perspectives on India-Sri Lanka Relations*, New Delhi/ Colombo, Manak/South Asia Peace Institute Colombo, 2011.
- LOGANATHAN, *Sri Lanka: Lost Opportunities*, Colombo, Cepra, 2006.
- NARAYAN SWAMY, M R, *The Tiger Vainquished. LTTE's Story*, New Delhi, Sage Publications, 2010
- MCGILIVRAY, Fiona, SMITH, Alastair *Punishing the Prince: A Theory of Interstate Relations, Political Institutions, and Leader Change*, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2008
- MUNI, S.D., *Pangs of Proximity: India and Sri Lanka's Ethnic Crisis*, Sage Publications, New Delhi, 1993
- MURARI S., *The Prabhakaran Saga: The Rise and Fall of an Eelam Warrior*, New Delhi, Sage Publications, 2012.
- MULLER, Pierre, SUREL, Yves, *L'analyse des politiques publiques*, Paris, Montchrestien, 1998.
- RUPESSINGHE, Kumar (Ed.), *Negotiating Peace in Sri Lanka: Efforts, Failures and Lessons*, vol (1), Colombo, Foundation for Co-Existence, p 11.
- SINGH, Harkirat, *Intervention in Sri Lanka: the IPKF Experience retold*, New Delhi, Manohar Publishers, 2007
- SURYANARAYANA, P.S., *The Peace Trap: An Indo- Sri Lankan political Crisis*, New Delhi, Affiliated East West Press, 1988.
- SWAMY; Subramanian, *Sri Lanka in Crisis: India's Options*, New Delhi, Har Anand Publications, 2007

WEBER, *The Profession and Vocation of Politics*, in Lassman and Spiers, *Weber: Political Writings*, pp. 309-369.

WEISS, Gordon, *The Cage, The Fight for Sri Lanka and the Last Days of the Tamil Tigers*, London, Vintage, 2012.

WILSON, A.J., *The Break-up of Sri Lanka : The Sinhalese Tamil Conflict*, Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1988

### Book Chapters

ABRAHAM, Thomas, « The Emergence of the LTTE and the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement of 1987 », in Kumar RUPESINGHE (Ed.), *Negotiating Peace in Sri Lanka: Efforts, Failures and Lessons*, vol 1., Colombo, Foundation for Co-Existence, 2006.

KODIKARA, Shelton U., « Geostrategic Perspectives of Indo-Sri Lanka Relations », in Shelton U. Kodikara (Ed.), op. cit., *Dilemmas of Indo-Sri Lanka Relations*, Colombo, Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies, 1991.

PALIER, Bruno, « Path Dependence », *Dictionnaire des politiques publiques*, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 2010, pp.411-419.

### Scientific Reviews

AYOOB, Mohammed, « India in South Asia: The Quest for Regional Predominance », *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 7, n° 1, Winter 1989/1990, pp. 107-133

CARMENT, David, « Les dimensions internes des comportements en temps de crise : étude de cas entre l'Inde et le Sri Lanka 1983-1990 », *Etudes internationales*, vol. 23, n° 2, 1992, pp. 253-277

CARMENT, David, JAMES, Patrick, « Two Level Games and Third-Party Intervention: Evidence from Ethnic Conflict in the Balkans and South Asia », *Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique*, Vol. 29, n° 3, September 1996, pp. 521-554

DIXON, William J., 'Third Party Interventions into Civil Wars: An Actor –Centric Approach', vol. 50, n° 4, *International Organization*, Autumn 1996, pp. 653-681.

FINDLEY, Michael G., TEO, Tze Kwang, « Rethinking Third-Party Interventions into Civil Wars: An Actor- Centric Approach », *The Journal of Politics*, vol. 68, n° 4, November 2006, pp. 828-837

FRAZIER, Derrick V., DIXON, William J., « Third Party Intermediaries and Negotiated Settlements, 1946-2000 », *International Interactions*, vol. 32, n° 4, 2006, pp. 385-408.

GRIGORYAN, Arman, « Third Party Intervention and the Escalation of State-Minority Conflicts », *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 54, n° 4, December 2010, pp. 1143-1174

HAGERTY, D.T., « India's Regional and Security Doctrine », *Asian Survey*, vol. 3, 1991, pp. 351-363.

HARSHE, Rajen, « Systemic Upheaval and Crises: Lessons for India », *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 26, n° 41, October 1991, pp. 2348-2352

JUDGE, Timothy A., PICCOLO, Ronald F., KOSALKA, Tomek, « The bright and dark sides of leader traits: A Review and theoretical extension of the leader trait paradigm », *The Leadership Quarterly*, vol. 20, n° 6, December 2009, pp. 855-875.

KOGA, Jun, « Where do Third Parties Intervene? Third Parties' Domestic Institutions and Military Interventions in Civil Conflicts », *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 55, n° 4, December 2011, pp. 1143-1166

KOHLI Atul, « Politics of Economic Growth in India, 1980-2005 » (Part 1 the 1980s), *Economic and Political Weekly*, April 2006, pp 1251-1259.

KRASNER Stephen D., « Approaches to the State. Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics », *Comparative Politics*, January 1984, n° 16, pp. 223-246.

MARASINGHE, M.L., « Ethnic Politics and Constitutional Reform: The Indo-Sri Lankan Accord », *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, Vol. 37, n° 3, July 1988, pp. 551-587

- MAOZ, Zeeb, TERRIS, Lesley G., KUPERMAN, Ranan D., TALMUD, Ilan, “What is the Enemy of My Enemy? Causes and Consequences of Imbalanced International Relations, 1816-2001”, *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 69, n°1, February 2007, pp. 100-115
- MULLENBACH, Mark J., “Deciding to keep peace: An Analysis of International Influences on the Establishment of Third-Party Peacekeeping Missions”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 49, n° 3, September 2005, pp. 529-555
- OWEN, David, “Hubris and Nemesis in Heads of Government”, *Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine*, vol. 99, n° 11, November 2006, pp. 548-551.
- OWEN, David, DAVIDSON, Jonathan, “Hubris syndrome: An Acquired Personality Disorder ? A Study of US Presidents and UK Prime Ministers over the last 100 years”, *BRAIN- A Journal of Neurology*, vol. 132, n° 5, February 2009, pp. 1396-1406.
- PFaffenberger, Bryan, “Sri Lanka in 1987: Indian Intervention and Resurgence of the JVP”, *Asian Survey*, Vol. 28, n°2, A Survey of Asia in 1987: Part II, February 1988, pp. 137-147
- PIERSON Paul, «The Path to European Integration. A Historical Institutional Analysis », *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 29, n° 2, April 1996, pp. 123-163
- PREMDAS, Ralph R., SAMARASINGHE, S.W.R. de A., “Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Conflict: The Indo-Lanka Peace Accord”, *Asian Survey*, Vol. 28, n° 6, June 1988, pp. 676-690
- REGAN, Patrick M., “Third Party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate Conflicts”, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 46, n° 1, February 2002, pp. 55-73
- ROSENTHAL, Seth A., PITTINSKY, Todd L., “Narcissistic Leadership”, *The Leadership Quarterly*, vol. 17, n°6, December 2006, pp. 617-633.
- RUPESINGHE, Kumar, Ethnic Conflicts in South Asia: The Case of Sri Lanka and the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF), *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 25, n° 4, December 1988, pp. 337-350
- RUSSELL, Gerald, “Psychiatry and Politicians: the ‘hubris’ syndrome”, *The Psychiatrist*, March 2011, vol. 35, n° 4, pp. 140-145.
- SINGER, Marshall R., “Sri Lanka in 1990: The Ethnic Strife Continues”, *Asian Survey*, Vol. 31, n° 2, A Survey of Asia in 1990: Part II, February 1991, pp. 140-145
- THEAKSTON, Kevin, “Gordon Brown as Prime Minister: Political Skills and Leadership Style”, *British Politics*, 6, 2011, pp. 78-100.
- VENKATESHWAR RAO P., “Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka : India’s Role and Perception”, *Asian Survey*, vol.28, n°4, April 1988, pp 419-436
- WENDT, Alexander, “Anarchy is what States make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics”, *International Organization*, vol. 46, n° 2, Spring 1992, pp. 391- 425.
- ‘Developments in South Asia’, *Strategic Survey*, Vol. 88, n°1, 1987, pp. 142-149, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/04597238708460752>

### Newspaper articles

- « Indians to send convoy to Sri Lanka », *New York Times*, June 2<sup>nd</sup> 1987; “Indian Flotilla turned back by Sri Lankan Navy vessels, *New York Times*, 4<sup>th</sup> June 1987.
- SUBRAMANIAM T.S., “We will fight for our political objective” (Interview with Prabhakaran), vol. 27, Issue 1, *FRONTLINE*, January 2010, <http://www.frontline.in/static/html/fl2701/stories/19870822078.htm>
- PERERA, Janaka, “Indo-Lanka Accord: Sri Lanka’s ‘Finlandisation’”, *Asian Tribune*, 20th July 2013, <http://www.asiantribune.com/node/63310>
- SOYSA Ranjith, “The Indian Intervention on 29<sup>th</sup> July 1987- “the 17<sup>th</sup> Invasion of Sri Lanka by India in the Island’s 2500 Year History”, July 30<sup>th</sup>, 2013, <http://www.asiantribune.com/node/63316>

“Rajiv Gandhi wanted Bofors Money to rule the Congress: Ex- CBI Chief”, *The Times of India*, 14 November 2013, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Rajiv-Gandhi-wanted-Bofors-money-to-run-Congress-Ex-CBI-chief/articleshow/25720914.cms>,

“Nehru and Indian Foreign Policy. 27<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of Indo-Lanka Accord”, *The Island*, 26 July 2014, [http://www.island.lk/index.php?page\\_cat=article-details&page=article-details&code\\_title=107437](http://www.island.lk/index.php?page_cat=article-details&page=article-details&code_title=107437)

### Articles from Internet Websites

Bharat-Rashak (2008), « Operation Poomalai-India Intervention », <http://www.bharat-rashak.com/LAND-FORCES/Army/History/1987/Chapter02.html>

<sup>1</sup> « India Air Lifts Aid to Tamil Rebels », New York Times, 5th June 1987, Bharat-Rashak, « Indian Air Force in Sri Lankan Operation Poomalai-The Jaffna Food Drop », <http://www.bharat-rashak.com/IAF/History/1987IPKF/Chapter1.html>

KELEGAMA, J.B., *The Significance of the Ceylon-China Trade Agreement of 1952*, 22 décembre 2002, <http://www.island.lk/2002/12/22/featur06.html>

*History of the JVP (People's Liberation Front- Sri Lanka)*, Niyamuwa Publications, 2014 (1<sup>st</sup> Ed.), [http://www.jvpsrilanka.com/en/images/e\\_books/history-of-the-jvp.pdf](http://www.jvpsrilanka.com/en/images/e_books/history-of-the-jvp.pdf)

The Tigers, <http://global.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/581988/Tamil-Tigers>.

Prabhakaran's Sudumalai Speech, 4<sup>th</sup> august 1987, the Speech can be heard here <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-XMLu3wpCnA>.

University of Human Rights (JAFFNA), [Broken Palmyra, UTHR, http://www.uthr.org/BP/Content.htm](http://www.uthr.org/BP/Content.htm)

Vaddukoddai Resolution adopted by the TULF,

[http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/shrilanka/document/papers/vaddukoddai\\_resolution.htm](http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/shrilanka/document/papers/vaddukoddai_resolution.htm)

### Conference Paper

SOOSAITHASAN, “The Indo Lankan Accord (1987-1990) A Deciding Factor to the Peace Process in the Sri Lankan Conflict?”, *Locating Sri Lankan Politics : Power, Space, Dissent*, University of Southampton, 11-13 April 2011, BASAS (British Association of South Asian Studies) and Institute of Historical Research Centre.

### Interviews

Military officers and politicians in New Delhi, Chennai, Thanjavur, Trichy, April 2013.

Erik Solheim, April 2014, Paris